Is HIV  Extraordinary ? by Hansell, Jordan B.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 96 Issue 4 
1998 
Is HIV "Extraordinary"? 
Jordan B. Hansell 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Disability Law Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jordan B. Hansell, Is HIV "Extraordinary"?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1095 (1998). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol96/iss4/5 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
Is HIV "Extraordinary"? 
Jordan B. Hansell 
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act")1 attempts to 
reduce inconsistencies in the sentences of defendants convicted of 
comparable crimes.2 The Act created a Sentencing Commission 
(the "Commission") and authorized it to promulgate a set of sen­
tencing guidelines to steer judicial decisionmaking.3 To fulfill this 
mandate, the Commission drafted the Federal Sentencing Guide­
lines (the "Guidelines"), which Congress enacted in 1987.4 
Although Congress wanted to eliminate sentencing disparities, it 
also wanted to allow some degree of individualized sentencing.5 To 
achieve the correct balance, the Commission created three catego­
ries of characteristics: those a court must consider in sentencing 
each defendant;6 those a court must never consider;7 and those that, 
while normally irrelevant to sentencing decisions, a court may con­
sider when circumstances warrant.8 Among the characteristics usu-
1. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3673 
(1994); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994) (Title II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984)). 
2. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38-39 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3221-22. 
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). 
4. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANuAL, ch. 1, pt. A, 
intro. comment (1995). 
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 991{b)(l)(B) (providing that the purpose of the Guidelines is to avoid 
disparity in sentencing "while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized 
sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the 
establishment of general sentencing practices"). 
6. These include the defendant's role in the offense, the defendant's criminal history, and 
the scope of the defendant's dependence upon criminal activity for his livelihood. See 
U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.7-.9. 
7. These include: race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status, see 
U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.10; lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances, see U.S.S.G. 
§ 5Hl.12; and drug or alcohol dependence, see U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.4. 
8. These include: age; education and vocational skills; mental and emotional conditions; 
physical condition; employment record; family ties and responsibilities, and community ties, 
see U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.1-.6; military, civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related con­
tributions; and record of prior good works, see U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.11. For a good general discus­
sion of the interplay between these three types of characteristics, see United States v. Rivera, 
994 F.2d 942, 948-49 (1st Cir. 1993). 
In Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996), the Supreme Court appeared to give 
sentencing courts more leeway in departing from the Guidelines. See Mark D. Harris & 
Douglas A. Berman, The Koon Case: Departures and Discretion, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 4, 
4 (1996). Exactly how this case will affect sentencing decisions, however, is unclear. See 
generally id. Some argue that Koon will emancipate sentencing judges, while others argue 
that it maintains the status quo. See generally Koon v. United States: The Supreme Court's 
Puzzling Ruling on Departures and Discretion, 9 FED. SENTENCING REP. 2 (1996). Early 
reports seem to suggest that little has changed. See id. at 5. Irrespective of the effect of the 
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ally inapposite to a sentencing court's decision is the physical 
condition of the defendant - a consideration mentioned in section 
5H1.4 of the Guidelines.9 Only when the defendant's condition 
represents an "extraordinary physical impairment"10 may the sen­
tencing court grant a downward departure or consider a sentence 
other than imprisonment, 11 
Courts have been unable to agree on the question of whether 
HIV-positive status, HIV with an attending medical complication, 
or AIDS should count as extraordinary physical impairments war­
ranting a downward departure.12 Unfortunately, this problem will 
not fade away. Experts predict that the number of HIV infections 
will increase in the coming years,13 disproportionately affecting 
criminal populations.14 This Note argues that HIV-positive status, 
HIV with an attending medical complication, and AIDS should not 
automatically qualify as extraordinary physical impairments. 
Rather, the sentencing court should make findings of fact to deter­
mine whether the individual defendant suffers from a related com­
plication - either before or after any explicit application of the 
Koon decision, sentencing courts still must decide whether HIV and AIDS warrant down­
ward departures. Consequently, courts must continue to wrestle with the question this Note 
addresses. 
9. See U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.4. 
10. U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.4. 
11. See U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.4. The primary alternative sentence is home detention. See 
U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.4. 
12. Compare United States v. Shein, 31 F.3d 135, 138 {3d Cir. 1994) (arguing that HIV 
with a serious complication should count as an extraordinary physical impairment) with 
United States v. DePew, 751 F. Supp. 1195, 1199 (E.D. Va. 1990) {"Only an 'extraordinary 
physical impairment' may justify a sentence other than imprisonment. AIDS is not such a 
'physical impairment' . . .. " (citation omitted)). One court has even found that all three 
conditions might qualify if particular, though unspecified, characteristics were present. See 
United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 729 {8th Cir. 1995) ("To some extent, both sides have 
argued this case as if it presented the abstract question whether someone with an HIV infec· 
tion, or with ARC, or with AIDS, is suffering from an 'extraordinary physical impairment.' 
No doubt there is a sense in which an affirmative answer would be proper in all three of these 
situations."). 
13. Despite the relatively limited number of ways in which an individual can contract the 
HIV virus, the number of those infected has increased rapidly, and experts expect further 
growth in the coming years. See Helena Brett-Smith & Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission 
and Treatment, in AIDS LAW TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FOR THE PuBLIC 18, 19 {Scott Burris et 
al. eds., 1993). The World Health Organization has estimated that between eight and ten 
million adults and one million children may be infected worldwide and that the numbers may 
quadruple by the year 2000. See id. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control 
{CDC) had received reports of 200,000 cases of full-blown AIDS by 1991. See id. These 
cases generally repid Perlman, AIDS Deaths Drop Sharply Again in S.F., S.F. CHRoN., Oct. 
15, 1997, at Al (noting a trend in the declining number of AIDS cases and deaths in San 
Francisco). 
14. See Alexa Freeman, HIV in Prison, in AIDS LAw TODAY: A NEW GUIDE FoR THE 
PuBuc, supra note 13, at 263, 264. Individuals within these populations commonly have a 
history of behavior, such as intravenoresent only the sickest individuals and constitute only a 
small portion of those who are HIV positive. See id. But see Davus drug use, that places 
them in high risk categories. See id. 
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AIDS label - such that the related complication qualifies him for a 
downward departure.is 
To support this claim, this Note proceeds in two steps. Part I 
provides a systematic test for courts to consider in determining 
whether an extraordinary physical impairment exists. It then exam­
ines the legislative history and language of the Act, the language of 
the Guidelines, and several cases that have addressed this issue. 
Using these sources, this Part identifies four relevant factors that 
should guide the extraordinary physical impairment 
determination.16 
Part II applies this four-factor test to HIV and argues that one 
factor, the severity and predictability factor, proves determinative 
in assessing the applicability of HIV status to downward departures. 
It then posits that the remainin� factors of the general test enunci­
ated in Part I all point toward declaring HIV ordinary. 
15. At least one commentator, James MacGillis, advocates a broader standard. Under 
MacGillis's scheme, a medical diagnosis of AIDS or advanced mv itself would suffice as an 
extraordinary physical impairment. See James C. MacGillis, Note, The Dilemma of Disparity: 
Applying the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Downward Departures Based on HW Infec­
tion, 81 MINN. L. REv. 229, 253 (1996) ("Courts should consider departing below the Guide­
lines range for an offender with AIDS or an advanced IDV designation because the 
advanced stages of mv will produce an 'extraordinary physical impairment."' (emphasis 
added)). Under MacGillis's definition, a person has late-stage IDV if he fits within the third 
or fourth CDC classification group. See id. at 253 n.119. 
This Note argues that these labels, while helpful, fail to correspond to the Guidelines' 
requirements for finding a physical impairment extraordinary. The CDC classifications 
neither provide nor are intended to provide courts with the kind of guidance required in this 
area. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
MacGillis also argues that in addition to § 5Hl.4, § 5K2.0 - the catchall departure guide­
line that allows downward departures for conditions the Commission did not consider ade­
quately - supports finding AIDS and advanced IDV to be extraordinary impairments. See 
U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0; see also MacGillis, supra, at 241-42. Sections 5K2.0 and 5Hl.4, however, 
are related in a way that makes discussion of both unnecessary. '!lie term "extraordinary" in 
§ 5Hl.4 represents the physical condition analogue to § 5K2.0's general directive about inad­
equately considered conditions. See Bruce Selya & Matthew Kipp, An Examination of 
Emerging Departure Jurisprudence Under Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 67 NOTRE DAME L. 
REv. 1, 22-23, 31-38 (1991) (arguing that a§ SHl.4 departure based on a defendant's physical 
condition is a "quantitative" departure under § 5K2.0); cf. United States v. Lopez, 938 F.2d 
1293, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (using§ 5K2.0 to define the term "extraordinary" for§ SHl.1). 
But see United States v. Rabins, 63 F3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 1995) (Wilson, J., dissenting) 
("[E]ven assuming arguendo that § 5Hl.4 should not be interpreted [as including an IDV­
positive defendant with a deteriorating condition,] 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) and§ 5K2.0 provide 
independent bases for departure under circumstances of a deteriorating IDV patient."). Sec­
tion 5K2.0 mirrors § 3553(b) in allowing for departures for conditions the Sentencing Com­
mission has not adequately considered. See, e.g. , Selya & Kipp, supra, at 22. By definition, 
when a condition is extraordinary, the Commission did not adequately consider it and a de­
parture is therefore warranted. This connection between the two sections means that an 
exhaustive discussion of both is unnecessary. 
16. For a good overview of some of these factors, see generally Stacey M. Studnicki, 
Individualized Sentencing: Federal Sentencing Departures Based upon Physical Condition, 
1994 DET. C. L. REv. 1215. 
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PART I: CRAFTING THE EXTRAORDINARY PHYSICAL 
IMPAIRMENT TEST 
This Part suggests a test for sentencing courts to use in deciding 
whether a defendant suffers from an extraordinary physical impair­
ment. It considers the statutory language and history of the Sen­
tencing Reform Act, the language of the Guidelines, and several 
cases in compiling a comprehensive list of factors a court should 
consider.17 It concludes that there are four18 relevant factors: (1) 
whether the condition severely and predictably impairs the defend­
ant; (2) whether the prison system is able to provide necessary med­
ical care; (3) whether incarceration will worsen the defendant's 
condition; and ( 4) whether the condition exposes the defendant to 
victimization.19 
17. Section I.A refers to statutory debates and language surrounding both the general 
departure standard and those sections relating directly to physical condition. The Sentencing 
Commission ultimately placed the general standard in § 5K2.0 and the physical condition 
standard in § 5Hl.4. While this Note concentrates on § 5Hl.4, the interrelation between the 
two provisions, see supra note 15, makes an inquiry into Congress's attitude toward the gen­
eral standard a worthwhile and germane endeavor. 
18. Courts and commentators have discussed two additional factors that this Note con­
tends are irrelevant. First, they have considered the cost of caring for the defendant. See 
Rabins, 63 F.3d at 735-37 (Wi son, J., dissenting); MacGillis, supra note 15, at 255. But 
§ 5Hl.4, on which these courts rely, allows a sentencing court to consider the costs of caring 
for the defendant only in those cases in which the court has previously found the defendant 
to suffer from an extraordinary physical impairment. 
This reading of the cost consideration is consistent with the overall two-step approach 
that Congress created for departure decisions. This Note addresses whether HIV should be 
considered extraordinary, but a sentencing court has two steps it must traverse before it can 
grant a departure. First, the court must determine whether the condition is extraordinary. 
Second, the court must determine whether that condition warrants a downward departure. 
Congress hinted at this two-part analysis when it explained: 
A particular kind of circumstance, for example, might not have been considered by 
the Sentencing Commission at all because of its rarity, or it might have been considered 
only in its usual form and not in the particularly extreme form present in a particular 
case. The provision recognizes, however, that even though the judge finds an aggravat­
ing or mitigating circumstance in the case that was not adequately considered in the 
formulation of the guidelines, the judge might conclude that the circumstance does not 
justify a sentence outside the guidelines. 
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 78-79 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3261-62. This lan­
guage eventually found its way into § 5K2.0. Given the interaction between § 5K2.0 and 
§ 5Hl.4, see supra note 15, that language is applicable in this case. Consequently, the court 
should first decide whether the condition is extraordinary and then decide whether it justifies 
a departure. 
Second, courts have discussed the continued dangerousness of the defendant as a factor 
for departure. See, e.g., Rabins, 63 F.3d at 735-38 (Wilson, J., dissenting). This factor 
originates from the third of the original four purposes of sentencing: protecting the public 
from further crimes. Cf infra note 22 and accompanying text. No court has found this factor 
to be directly relevant to the impairment decision because releasing a criminally dangerous 
defendant violates the third purpose of sentencing regardless of his condition. See, e.g., 
Rabins, 63 F.3d at 735-38 (Wi son, J., dissenting). 
19. How these factors play out will depend on the facts of each case. This Note does not 
attempt to supply a method of application for each possible physical condition. Rather, it 
argues only that the first factor, as applied to HIV, is both necessary and sufficient for finding 
an extraordinary physical impairment. See infra Part II. 
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A. The Severe and Predictable Condition 
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Section I.A argues that a court should consider whether the de­
fendant's condition severely impairs her in a predictable manner. 
Specifically, section l.A.1 contends that congressional discussion of 
the Act's goals and of the physical condition category supports the 
severity requirement. Section l.A.2 then maintains that Congress's 
desire for fairness and rationality supports requiring a predictable 
condition. 
1. The Severity Requirement 
Congress intended for only severe physical conditions to play a 
role in departure decisions. Congress first evinced this intention by 
focusing the sentencing decision on a defendant's criminal charac­
teristics, as opposed to personal traits.20 This choice is evident in 
Congress's enunciation of the four purposes of sentencing:21 
1) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 2) to afford ade­
quate deterrence to criminal conduct; 3) to protect the public from 
further crimes of the defendant; and, 4) to provide the defendant with 
the needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner.22 
Notably, the first three goals of sentencing have nothing to do with 
the defendant's personal characteristics; they concentrate either on 
punishment or deterrence. Only with respect to the fourth goal -
rehabilitation - might one argue that Congress considered the de­
fendant's personal characteristics - that is, those characteristics 
that would make the defendant either amenable or not amenable to 
certain rehabilitative efforts. The rehabilitative goal, however, has 
fallen out of favor, as evidenced by section 994(k) of the Act. In it, 
Congress instructed the Commission to create Guidelines that "re­
flect the inappropriateness" of sentencing a defendant for the pur­
pose of rehabilitation.23 
20. See United States v. Bell, 974 F.2d 537, 539 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the Guidelines 
seek uniformity by resting "'sentences upon the offense committed, not upon the offender' " 
(quoting United States v. Melian, 920 F.2d 313, 319 (4th Cir. 1989))); see also THOMAS W. 
HUTCHINSON & DA vm YELLEN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAw AND PRACTICE 766-67 (2d ed. 
1994) ("The Guidelines thus reflect decisions by Congress to some extent, but especially by 
the Commission, to devise a sentencing scheme based primarily on the characteristics of the 
offense, not the offender."). 
21. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1994); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 161, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3344. 
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1994). 
23. Section 994(k) reads as follows: "The Commission shall insure that the guidelines 
reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the pur­
pose of rehabilitating the defendant ... . " 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994). 
Congress intimated its disfavor with rehabilitation as a purpose in sentencing when it 
stated: "[A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system now doubts that rehabilita­
tion can be induced reliably in a prison setting, and it is now quite certain that no one can 
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One also finds Congress's intent to downplay a defendant's per­
sonal characteristics in its description of section 3553(a)(1), which 
calls on the sentencing judge to consider the defendant's history 
and characteristics.24 Congress stated, "[w]ith respect to the history 
and characteristics of the defendant, the judge must consider such 
matters as the criminal history of the defendant, as well as the na­
ture and effect of any previous criminal sanctions."25 Any similar 
directive with respect to a defendant's personal characteristics is 
conspicuously absent from Congress's discussion. 
Congress's limitation of the consideration of a defendant's per­
sonal characteristics in the context of the penal system's goals sug­
gests that consideration of personal characteristics should be 
limited in sentencing decisions as well. Because physical condition 
is a personal characteristic, one may assume that Congress pre­
ferred that courts take the same overall approach with respect to it 
as they do toward personal characteristics in general. 
A given personal characteristic does become relevant to a de­
fendant's sentence when it is severe.26 1\vo arguments support this 
position. First, Congress used the analogous word "serious" in 
describing conditions that should qualify as extraordinary physical 
impairments.27 In describing 28 U.S.C. § 994(d)(5),28 the provision 
that instructs the Commission to consider physical condition, Con­
gress stated that under certain circumstances involving a "particu­
larly serious illness," a court may give probation to a defendant who 
otherwise would go to prison.29 
Second, Congress intimated a severity requirement in its paral­
lel treatment of downward departures for physical condition and 
sentence modifications.30 These two provisions address similar is­
sues, but at different stages in the penal process. Downward depar-
really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated." S. REP. No. 225, at 38, reprinted in 
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3221. This argument about the relative unimportance of rehabilitation 
holds despite the fact that Congress instructed the Commission not to completely abandon 
rehabilitation as a sentencing goal. See United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 604 (2d Cir. 
1990) ("Further, although the role of rehabilitation in sentencing has been sharply restricted 
by the Guidelines, rehabilitation has not been entirely eliminated from the sentencing pro­
cess."); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 76, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3259. Despite rehabilita· 
tion's apparent retention of a fingernail hold, the fact remains that three of the four 
sentencing rationales fail to consider a defendant's personal characteristics and that Congress 
has questioned the role of the only one that does. 
24. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a}(1}. 
25. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 75, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3258 (emphasis added). 
26. See HUTCHISON & YELLEN, supra note 20, at 767. 
27. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 173, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3356. 
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(d}(5) (1994) (listing the consideration "physical condition, includ­
ing drug dependence"). 
29. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 173, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3356. 
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582 (1994); S. REP. No. 98-225, at 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 3238. 
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tures address any conditions present at the time of sentencing, 
while modifications address conditions that have developed or 
progressed while the inmate was in prison. Congress declared that 
a severe illness would suffice for both determinations.31 To give 
courts guidance, Congress cited terminal cancer, an obviously se­
vere example.32 
The Sentencing Commission followed through on Congress's di­
rectives and incorporated them into the Guidelines. The Commis­
sion emphasized criminal, rather than personal, characteristics.33 
The Commission also adopted almost verbatim Congress's language 
limiting relevant physical conditions to those that are severe.34 
First, the Commission created guidelines that define "the de­
fendant strictly in criminal terms, not personal ones."35 Conse­
quently, personal characteristics, as a general category, ordinarily 
are irrelevant to a sentencing court's decision.36 Personal charac­
teristics, such as physical condition, become part of the sentencing 
consideration only when they are extraordinary in nature.37 
The Guidelines provide little room for a court to consider the 
defendant's personal traits in sentencing.38 Specifically, in Part H 
of Chapter 5, the Sentencing Commission outlined the role criminal 
and personal characteristics are to play in a defendant's sentence.39 
The Commission stated that only the defendant's role in the of­
fense,40 criminal history,41 and dependence on criminal activity for 
31. First, Congress stated that only a severe condition supported a sentence modification. 
See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 55, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3238 ("The Committee be­
lieves that there may be unusual cases in which an eventual reduction in the length of a term 
of imprisonment is justified by changed circumstances. These would include cases of severe 
illness . . • .  " (emphasis added)). Second, Congress said that the same standard should apply 
to both provisions. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 173, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3356. 
32. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 173, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3356. Courts have 
followed this admonition, finding metastasized cancer to be an extraordinary physical impair­
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Velasquez, 762 F. Supp. 39 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
33. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 75, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3258; see also supra 
notes 20-25 and accompanying text. 
34. See U.S.S.G. § SHl.4. 
35. HUTCHISON & YELLEN , supra note 20, at 766. 
36. See id. 
37. See id. at 767 ("Most courts have held that, by clear implication, when personal cir­
cumstances are present that are not 'ordinary,' but are rather 'extraordinary,' the sentencing 
court may depart from the applicable range."). 
38. The Second Circuit emphasized the distinction between criminal and personal traits 
when it noted: "The contrast between th[e] highly detailed categorization of offense conduct 
and the treatment of the character of the defendant could scarcely be more marked. For, as 
to defendant characteristics, the Guidelines contain virtually no categorizing instructions." 
United States v. Merritt, 988 F.2d 1298, 1307-08 (2d Cir. 1993); see also HUTCHISON & 
YELLEN, supra note 20, at 767. 
39. See HUTCHISON & YELLEN, supra note 20, at 767; U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H. 
40. See U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.7. 
41. See U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.8. 
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livelihood42 are always relevant to a court's sentencing decision. 
Each of these considerations pertains to a defendant's criminal 
attributes. 
Second, and more important, the Commission adopted Con­
gress's language in discussing the specific role of extraordinary 
physical impairments. Section SH1.4 provides that the defendant's 
condition must be both serious and incapacitating to justify a depar­
ture. In defining which physical conditions could constitute 
grounds for a departure, section SH1.4 uses the word "impairment" 
and gives as an example a "seriously infirm defendant."43 The word 
"impairment" alone requires that there be some reduction in the 
defendant's ability to function. If this were not the case, and the 
defendant could function normally despite his condition, there 
would be no reason for a court to declare his case extraordinary and 
section SH1.4 would not apply. In addition, the Commission's use 
of the word "seriously" indicates that it took to heart Congress's 
limitation on the applicability of nonsevere conditions. 
In short, Congress made clear its intention that only severe con­
ditions should qualify as extraordinary physical impairments. The 
Commission, following that directive, then created Guidelines that 
appropriately limited extraordinary physical impairments to severe 
conditions.44 
2. The Predictability Requirement 
Congress wanted defendants convicted of similar conduct to re­
ceive similar sentences and wanted those sentences to be fair and 
rational. This section argues that Congress's desire for fairness and 
rationality militates in favor of establishing a predictability require­
ment for physical impairment decisions. 
The central goal of the Act was to eliminate sentencing dispari­
ties among similarly situated defendants.45 Congress wanted to en­
courage fairness by reducing disparity.46 In fact, Congress directed 
judges to consider "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispar­
ities among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct."47 Similarly, Congress instructed the Sen­
tencing Commission to create guidelines that "provide .. . fairness 
in meeting the purposes of sentencing."48 In relation to an ex­
traordinary physical impairment, fairness means that defendants 
42. See U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.9. 
43. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 (emphasis added). 
44. See supra note 15. 
45. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 78 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3261. 
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(B) (1994). 
47. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (1994). 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 99l(b)(l)(B) (emphasis added). 
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with identical conditions should receive identical sentences.49 Were 
this not the case, courts could treat defendants who have precisely 
the same symptoms and prognoses differently. 
Congress emphasized that courts should be concerned with the 
fairness of their sentences "particularly in deciding when it is desir­
able to sentence outside the Guidelines. "SO In responding to a se­
ries of amendments offered by the House, the Senate clarified that 
the amendments would have no effect on the departure standard. 
Indeed, Senator Hatch said specifically that "[t]he standard for de­
parture is vital to the proper functioning of the Guidelines system, " 
and that should Congress relax the standard, "unwarranted depar­
tures would undermine the core function of the Guidelines . . . 
which is to reduce disparity ... and restore fairness ... to the sen­
tencing process."Sl 
Congress also aspired to create guidelines that would structure 
the sentencing decision and thereby rationalize the sentencing pro­
cess.s2 To emphasize its desires, Congress disparaged other sys­
tems s3 as "completely ineffective in ... imposing a rational order on 
... criminal sentencing."s4 Sentencing decisions based on unpre­
dictable conditions only add irrationality to the process, as they 
amount to little more than pure soothsaying.ss Courts therefore 
would irrationally grant different departures to identically situated 
defendants, thereby violating congressional intent. 
49. See infra section II.A (discussing the application of this test to :mv status and arguing 
that a per se rule based on IIlV's classifications could potentially treat identical defendants 
unfairly). 
50. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 78, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3261 (emphasis added). 
51. 133 CoNG. REc. 33,109 (1987) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added). 
52. Cf. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 79, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3262 (discussing the 
failure of the voluntary sentencing system in Massachusetts to provide this kind of rational 
order in rejecting an amendment to the Guidelines that would have allowed the sentencing 
court more discretion in deciding when to depart). 
53. Specifically, Congress discussed the Massachusetts state system and considered the 
efficacy of a voluntary, as opposed to a mandatory, system, see S. REP. No. 225, at 79, re­
printed in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3262, rather than the role of unpredictable physical condi­
tions in downward departures. Nevertheless, this discussion highlights a congressional desire 
for a rational system, and unpredictable physical conditions are as threatening to that goal as 
is a voluntary system. 
54. S. REP. No. 98-225, at 79, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3262 (noting testimony of 
Scott Harshbarger, District Attorney, Middlesex County, Massachusetts) (emphasis added). 
55. Congress chose to avoid decisions based on insufficient information when it chose to 
relegate rehabilitation in sentencing defendants to a minor role. It feared that our knowl­
edge of human behavior was too limited to serve as a basis for determining the length of a 
defendant's incarceration. See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 40, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
3223 ("We know too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a 
routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a particular prisoner has been 
rehabilitated."). 
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B. Providing the Necessary Medical Care 
A court should consider whether the prison system can provide 
a defendant with needed medical care,56 and, as a general rule, 
should not grant a downward departure if a defendant's condition is 
one for which the prison system can provide the necessary care. 
Section 3553(a)(2)(D)57 mandates that the court consider whether 
the sentence can "provide the defendant with needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment 
in the most effective manner."58 By logical extension, a court could 
label a condition extraordinary and depart from the Guidelines if its 
treatment requires more care than the prison system provides. 
In United States v. Greenwood, 59 the Fourth Circuit faced such a 
question. In that case, the government appealed the district court's 
downward departure, granted because the defendant was a Korean 
War veteran who had lost both his legs below the knee during his 
tour of duty.60 The court affirmed the district court's downward 
departure because incarceration would have jeopardized the treat­
ment Greenwood had been receiving at the Veterans Administra­
tion Hospital.61 
C. Prison's Effect on the Defendant's Condition62 
A court also should determine whether a defendant's time in 
prison will worsen his condition. As with the adequate care factor, 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Guerrero, 987 F.2d 618, 620 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The 
ability of the Bureau of Prisons to accommodate a disability is a factor which the district 
court may consider in making this factual finding."); see also United States v. McClean, 822 
F. Supp. 961, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (arguing that because prison officials refused to provide 
the defendant with the type of metal crutches he required, his severely crippled left leg con­
stituted an extraordinary physical impairment). 
57. Section 3553 provides a series of factors that courts should consider when fashioning 
a defendant's sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1994). 
58. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added). The validity of this reading of 
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) becomes apparent when one compares it to§ 994(k), which provides: "The 
Commission shall insure that the guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sen­
tence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing 
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correc­
tional treatment." 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1994) (emphasis added). The only way to reconcile 
these two provisions is to read§ 3553(a)(2)(D) as requiring a court to consider the possible 
inability of a sentence to provide the listed considerations as a drawback, rather than to 
consider that section as allowing a court to sentence a defendant to imprisonment to provide 
her with those services. 
59. 928 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1991). 
60. See 928 F.2d at 646. 
61. See 928 F.2d at 646. 
62. One must distinguish this factor from concern about the health and welfare of other 
inmates in the Federal System with respect to in-prison transmission of HIV. Courts do not 
typically consider other prisoners' health and welfare in the extraordinary physical 
impairment context Furthermore, while in-prison transmission does occur, the available 
evidence indicates that it does not occur at rates in excess of the spread in populations 
outside the prison system. See Richard S. Wi bur, AIDS and the Federal Bureau of Prisons: 
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this factor derives from section 3553(a)(2)(D), which requires a 
court to consider whether the sentence will provide the defendant 
with appropriate medical care.63 If incarceration would substan­
tially worsen a defendant's condition, clearly it would compromise 
the defendant's medical care and should weigh against a court's im­
posing that sentence.64 
Few courts have considered the extent to which the prison sys­
tem must exacerbate the defendant's condition for it to become ju­
dicially cognizable. In United States v. Jefferson, 65 one of the few 
cases to consider this factor, the district court indicated that the de­
fendant must be able to prove more than that "the defendant's 
medical conditions have been aggravated by prison life."66 Instead, 
the court held that the defendant must proffer "'extraordinary and 
compelling reasons' for reduction of [his] term."67 
D. The Possibility of Victimization 
Finally, a court should ascertain whether the defendant's condi­
tion will expose her to victimization at the hands of his fellow in­
mates. Of all the factors in this test, the threat-of-victimization 
factor stands on the softest ground. Not only was this factor com­
pletely fashioned by the courts,68 but the Commission has since al­
tered the Guidelines in an attempt to deemphasize possible 
victimization as grounds for a departure.69 Nonetheless, possible 
victimization remains a permissible justification for a court that 
wishes to grant a downward departure.70 
A Unique Challenge, 11 N. ILL U. L. REv. 275, 289-90 (1991) (citing Horsborough et al., 
Seroconversion to Human Immunodeficiency Virus in Prison Inmates, 80 AM. J. PuB. 
HEALTH 209, 209-10 (1990)). 
63. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D). 
64. See United States v. Jefferson, 786 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 1992); cf. United States 
v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that an HIV-positive defendant should 
not receive a downward departure in his sentence because he failed to present evidence that 
prison would worsen his condition). 
65. 786 F. Supp. 1267 (N.D. W. Va. 1992). 
66. 786 F. Supp. at 1267. 
67. 786 F. Supp. at 1268 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553). 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 905 F.2d 599, 603-05 (2d Cir. 1990). 
69. See Koon v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996); Christina Chiafolo Montgomery, 
Social and Schematic Injustice: The Treatment of Offender Personal Characteristics Under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 20 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Crv. CoNFINEMENT 27, 39-41 
(1993); Studnicki, supra note 16, at 1237. 
70. See, e.g., Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2051 {"The Commission did not see fit, however, to 
prohibit consideration of physical appearance in all cases, nor did it address the broader 
category of susceptibility to abuse in prison. By urging us to hold susceptibility to abuse in 
prison to be an impermissible factor in all cases, the Government would have us reject the 
Commission's considered judgment in favor of our own."). 
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The Second Circuit, in United States v. Lara, 71 first articulated 
potential victimization as a foundation for a downward departure. 
In that case, the defendant, Morales, was small in stature, effemi­
nate, and bisexual.72 During his incarceration pending sentencing, 
two inmates attempted to force Morales to serve as their prosti­
tute.73 To assure his safety, correctional officials placed Morales in 
solitary confinement.74 The court held that Morales's potential for 
victimization, combined with his placement in solitary confinement 
for protection, constituted an extraordinary situation that war­
ranted a downward departure.75 
Apparently in response to Lara, the Sentencing Commission 
amended section 5Hl.4 to include the phrase "[a defendant's] ap­
pearance, including physique, is not ordinarily relevant in determin­
ing whether a sentence should fall outside the applicable guideline 
range."76 Despite the Commission's reaction to Lara, some courts 
continue to rely on a defendant's potential for victimization to jus­
tify downward departures.77 Interestingly, these courts seem to 
combine the physical impairment language in section 5Hl.4 with 
Lara's potential-for-victimization rationale.78 For instance, the 
Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Long, 79 held that an "extraordi­
nary physical impairment that results in extreme vulnerability is a 
legitimate basis for departure."80 
The Supreme Court, in Koon v. United States, 81 appeared to ap­
prove of continuing to use victimization as a rationale for a down­
ward departure.82 The Court did not, however, approve the use of 
extraordinary physical impairment to grant a departure based on 
potential abuse.83 Rather, it noted that the Sentencing Commission 
inherently suggested that physical appearance could be relevant to 
sentencing under extraordinary circumstances when it categorized 
physical appearance as not ordinarily relevant.84 The Court then 
71. 905 F.2d 599, 601 {2d Cir. 1990). 
72. See 905 F.2d at 601. 
73. See 905 F.2d at 601. 
74. See 905 F.2d at 601. 
75. See 905 F.2d at 603. 
76. U.S.S.G. § 5Hl.4 (emphasis added), discussed in Montgomery, supra note 70, at 40. 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1277 {8th Cir. 1992). 
78. See Montgomery, supra note 70, at 40. 
79. 977 F.2d 1264 {8th Cir. 1992). 
80. 977 F.2d at 1277. 
81. 116 S. Ct 2035 {1996). 
82. See Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2053; see also supra note 8. 
83. See 116 S. Ct. at 2050-51. 
84. See 116 S. Ct. at 2051. 
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held that the same must be true for "the broader category of sus­
ceptibility to abuse in prison. "85 
In brief, the confluence of the statutory language, legislative his­
tory, and several judicial opinions yields a four-factored test that a 
court should use to evaluate physical conditions. The relative 
weight that a court should give to each factor will depend on the 
nature of the condition and its interplay with each other factor. 
p ART II: HIV STATUS AND THE EXTRAORDINARY PHYSICAL 
IMPAIRMENT TEST 
Part II argues that, given the four-factored test articulated 
above, courts should refrain from focusing their physical impair­
ment determination on HIV's labels. Rather, they should focus on 
the defendant's attendant condition, if any. Specifically, this Part 
posits that the severe and predictable factor of the test proves de­
terminative as to whether a court should find an extraordinary 
physical impairment. 
First, in applying the extraordinary physical impairment test to 
HIV status, section II.A argues that HIV's unpredictability makes 
the labels HIV and AIDS unreliable foundations for the extraordi­
nary physical impairment determination. Second, section II.A 
claims that the search for predictability correctly focuses the court 
on the nature of the condition that may accompany the defendant's 
HIV infection. It is this condition that may qualify as an extraordi­
nary physical impairment. This Part does not argue that HIV is 
completely irrelevant to the sentencing decision. For example, a 
court should view a defendant who is HIV-positive and has pneu­
monia differently from a defendant who has only pneumonia. This 
Part simply contends that the court should ask itself the following 
question: Taking the defendant's HIV status as a given, does the 
defendant suffer from an attendant condition that allows the court 
to predict with sufficient certainty her clinical outcome and its time 
frame? It is in this sense that the court should focus on the condi­
tion. The court should not ponder the defendant's viral load86 or 
CD4 counts,87 or rely on the number of years that have passed since 
85. 116 S. Ct at 2051. 
86. Physicians track the individual's viral load - the amount of virus per milliliter of 
blood - to determine the extent of the infection. See Ronald Baker, HIV Viral Load Test­
ing, BULL. EXPERIMENTAL TREAThfENT FOR AIDS (San Francisco AIDS Found., San Fran-
cisco, California), July 1996. 
· 
87. CD4 is a specific protein receptor located on the outside of certain human immune 
cells. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 13, at 21. Physicians monitor the individual's 
CD4 count to follow directly the deterioration of the individual's immune system. See id. at 
34. 
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the defendant's seroconversion.88 Nor should the court attempt to 
place the defendant somewhere within the CDC's classification sys­
tem and base its decisions on where she falls. 
Finally, sections II.B, II.C and II.D argue that the remaining 
three factors of the test all suggest that HIV or AIDS alone are 
ordinary conditions and that an HIV-related complication is either 
nondispositive or irrelevant with respect to each remaining factor. 
A. The Severe and Predictable Condition 
When a defendant's condition at the time of sentencing substan­
tially and permanently impairs him, or will do so with an acceptably 
predictable course,89 the court should find that it constitutes an ex­
traordinary physical impairment.90 HIV's unpredictable course91 
88. Seroconversion "means that the blood (serum) changes (converts) from negative to 
positive for the antibody test." Id. at 31. 
89. This Note purposely leaves concepts like "substantially impaired" and "acceptable 
predictability" somewhat undefined. Any such definitions, with respect to diseases like HIV, 
at their essence remain qualitative rather than quantitative. A terminal disease with a pre­
dictable course, however, should fall under these definitions. This Note uses "terminal" ac­
cording to its most common legal definition: a patient's condition is terminal when she has 
six months or less to live. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800(12) (1995) ('"Terminal disease' 
means an incurable and irreversible disease that . . .  will . . .  produce death within six (6) 
months."); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b) (1997) (limiting the Medicare hospice benefi.t to patients 
with a "prognosis . . .  for a life expectancy of 6 months or less if the terminal illness runs its 
normal course"). Nevertheless, even this definition, at base, is qualitative. Rather than pro­
viding sentencing judges with a binary choice, this Note seeks to provide them with the cor­
rect question to ask. Specifically, it seeks to dissuade them from blindly using the categories 
of HIV and AIDS to make their decisions. It argues that judges should concentrate instead 
on the particular complication that accompanies an HIV infection to determine whether the 
condition warrants a downward departure. 
90. At least one court has considered the severity-and-predictability factor in sentencing 
an HIV-positive defendant. See United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 729-29 (8th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the defendant's condition did not constitute an "extraordinary physical impair­
ment" because he was relatively healthy at the time of sentencing and could remain so for 
some time); see also Marjorie P. Russell, Too Little, Too Late, Too Slow: Compassionate 
Release of Terminally Ill Prisoners - Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?, 3 WIDENER J. Pua. 
L. 799, 813-14 (1994) (noting that § SHl.4 can provide for a lesser sentence for a defendant 
suffering from a terminal condition at the time of sentencing). 
91. Generally, immediately following infection, most individuals are asymptomatic and 
feel healthy. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 13, at 33. The individual remains in­
fectious, however, and her immune system begins to deteriorate. See id. The onset of some 
other infectious disease marks the next phase of the disease. Symptoms of this phase, among 
other manifestations, may include oral or vaginal thrush, anemia, swollen lymph glands, or 
shingles. See id. at 34. In addition, other diseases such as tuberculosis, syphilis, or hepatitis 
may become more difficult to treat as the individual's immune system becomes less effective. 
See id. 
The final stage of the disease is known as AIDS. At this point, the individual's CD4 count 
usually is particularly low and she is at great risk of contracting opportunistic infections. See 
id. at 35. The CDC defines an individual with AIDS as one who has a CD4 count persistently 
below 200/mm3, or any one of 26 complications that can accompany HIV infection, or both. 
See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., 
1993 Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case Defini­
tion for AIDS Among Adolescents and Adults, see MORBIDITY & MoRTAUTY WKLY. REP., 
Dec. 18, 1992, at 8 (hereinafter CDC Definition]. The term AIDS has a specific definition 
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makes this factor the dominant one in a court's decision whether to 
grant the departure.92 This same unpredictability makes the labels 
HIV and AIDS poor foundations for an extraordinary physical im­
pairment decision.93 Instead, the sentencing court should focus on 
any condition that attends the defendant's HIV infection and grant 
a downward departure only if that condition provides the requisite 
predictability. 
Predicting the course of HIV in a given individual is a daunting 
task because, on the individual level, HIV remains an erratic dis­
ease.94 The traditional understanding of HIV as a virus that pro­
gresses from a prolonged asymptomatic stage, to a mild illness 
stage, to a terminal stage over a predictable time period has proved 
not to fit reality.95 Instead, some individuals may develop severe 
complications soon after infection and die, while some may develop 
a complication, recover, and remain stable for years.96 Others may 
remain completely asymptomatic for years, while still others may 
appear outwardly healthy though their CD4 counts linger at levels 
under fifty cells per cubic millimeter.97 
As researchers have made medical advances, doctors' ability to 
predict HIV-positive individuals' longevity has simultaneously im­
proved and worsened. On the one hand, new treatments have ex­
tended the average AIDS patient's life expectancy from a few 
that the CDC has created, and periodically rewritten, to allow it to track the spread of the 
disease. This discussion may make IIlV progression appear predictable across large numbers 
of people. On the individual level, however, its progression remains sporadic. See infra notes 
94-102 and accompanying text. 
92. When applying the extraordinary physical impairment test to IIlV, this Note con­
cedes that mv infection is severe. It claims, however, that mv infection is too unpredict­
able to qualify alone as an extraordinary physical impairment, and that, consequently, the 
court should focus on the related complication. 
93. Despite the apparent predictive value of the CDC's definition, see supra note 88, the 
CDC never intended for its classification system to serve diagnostic or prognostic ends. 
Rather, the CDC created this definition to count and track the spread and severity of the 
illness. The commentary on the 1987 case definition delineated the purpose of the CDC's 
definition: 
This definition is intended only to provide consistent statistical data for public health 
purposes. Clinicians will not rely on this definition alone to diagnose serious disease 
caused by IIlV infection . . . . The diagnostic criteria accepted by the AIDS surveillance 
case definition should not be interpreted as the standard for good medical practice. 
Carol Levine & Gary L. Stein, What's in a Name? The Policy Implications of the CDC Defi­
nition of AIDS, 19 LAW, MEo. & HEALTH CARE 278, 280 (1991) (quoting the CDC's lan­
guage). The CDC definition does not attempt to predict how long a given patient, regardless 
of her AIDS classification, will survive. See id. 
94. See Brett-Smith & Friedland, supra note 13, at 37. 
95. See id. at 37-38. 
96. See id. at 38. 
97. See id. An individual's CD4 count can vary widely during the course of the disease 
with little relation to Jong-term prognosis. See id. at 36-37. Fifty cells per cubic millimeter is 
an arbitrary number. It is, however, extremely low. See id. at 38. The fact that an individual 
could continue to function normally with so low a count highlights the unpredictability of the 
disease. 
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months to a few years.98 New drug combinations have enabled phy­
sicians to eliminate the virus from their patients' blood streams.99 
The long-term potential of these new treatments, however, remains 
uncertain.1°0 The uncertain success of these treatments adds to the 
unpredictability of individual prognoses. 
On the other hand, scientists have identified better ways of de­
termining clinical outcomes. Most promisingly, researchers have 
developed viral load testing and have proved that a patient's viral 
load correlates with longevity.101 Nevertheless, while viral load can 
provide general guidelines for HIV progression and treatment, it is 
of limited value in ascertaining a given patient's longevity.102 
Some conditions that accompany AIDS infection, however, may 
provide the requisite predictability. Instead of focusing on the de­
fendant's HIV classification, a court should contemplate his related 
complication and the likely impact it will have on his health. If the 
court can satisfy itself that this complication furnishes the necessary 
predictability, it should classify that complication as an extraordi­
nary physical impairment and depart downward. 
Some have argued that courts have granted downward depar­
tures for conditions that seem much less extraordinary than AIDS 
or advanced HIV and that, therefore, AIDS or advanced HIV 
should qualify as well.1°3 Certain cases - such as the Fourth Cir­
cuit decision that granted a downward departure to a defendant 
who had lost the lower part of both of his legs104 and the Third 
Circuit decision that affirmed a departure for a defendant who suf­
fered from chronic pulmonary disease - might offer support for 
that argument.105 At first glance, these conditions do indeed ap-
98. See id. at 37. 
99. See John Schwartz, Three-Drug Treatment Shows Promise in Suppressing AIDS Virus, 
WASH. Posr, Jan. 30, 1996, at AB. 
100. See id. In fact, many patients have succumbed to HIV despite their religious adher­
ence to the new drug regimens. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Despite New AIDS Drugs, Many 
Still Lose the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1997, at Al. 
101. See Baker, supra note 86. 
102. There is some connection between viral load and prognosis - "the higher the viral 
load, the shorter the time to AIDS and the shorter the survival time." See id. Despite pro­
viding general predictions by range, viral load tests do not do so at the individual level. See 
E-mail from Gordon Nary, Executive Director, Intl. Assn. of Physicians in AIDS Care to 
Jordan Hansell (Mar. 12, 1997) (on file with author). Viral load count serves as a measure for 
the effectiveness of the treatment, not for the longevity of the individual patient. See The 
Relationship Between the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and the Acquired Immu­
nodeficiency Syndrome (pt. I), NIAID PRESs RELEASE (Natl. Inst. of Allergy and Infectious 
Diseases, Natl. Inst. of Health, Washington, D.C.), July 24, 1995. 
103. See United States v. Rabins, 63 F3d 721, 734 (8th Cir. 1995) (Wilson, J., dissenting); 
MacGillis, supra note 15, at 253. 
104. See United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645, 646 (4th Cir. 1991). 
105. See United States v. Little, 736 F. Supp. 71 (D.NJ.), affd., 919 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
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pear less "serious" than HIV infection. As Part I argues, _however, 
the question under section 5H1.4 is not about which condition is 
worse in some absolute sense, but about which is worse in a predict­
able way. Both of the conditions mentioned above are static - at 
the time of sentencing, the court is cognizant of the future impact of 
each. At present, however, it is impossible for a court to have a 
similar understanding of the future effects of HIV or AIDS. With­
out this understanding, neither HIV nor AIDS should be classified 
as extraordinary under section 5H1.4. 
Others have argued that courts should simply apply a per se rule 
to HIV.106 In particular, one author has argued that courts should 
draw the line at AIDS or advanced HIV.107 It is true that a test of 
this sort would provide a certain sort of predictability. Both outsid­
ers and defendants would know ex ante whether the defendant's 
status would qualify him for a downward departure.108 Neverthe­
less, it would fail to provide the kind of predictability Congress de­
sired and the Guidelines require. First, a rule of this type would fail 
to provide fairness. As argued above, advanced HIV and AIDS do 
not allow a court to predict longevity. Consequently, a court basing 
its decision on an AIDS classification might sentence two defend­
ants suffering from different complications - the true predictors of 
longevity - to identical sentences, thereby thwarting Congress's 
desire for fairness. 
Second, a test of this sort fails to provide the kind of rationality 
Congress desired. A court attempting to determine the length of a 
downward departure by considering an AIDS classification alone 
would be forced to rely on an uneducated guess as to the effect of 
the disease on the defendant: Will the defendant be incapacitated 
in ten weeks, ten months, or ten years? Basing a sentencing deci­
sion on something so mercurial, and thereby divorcing the sentenc­
ing decision from the defendant's true state, can only undermine 
Congress's desire for rational, principled decisionmaking. 
HIV and AIDS alone are simply too unpredictable to provide a 
foundation for a downward departure decision. Instead, a court 
should focus on the complication that accompanies the infection to 
determine whether it provides the necessary predictability. 
106. See, e.g., MacGillis, supra note 15, at 247. 
107. See id. 
108. A test of this sort might also simplify judicial administration. It certainly is simpler 
to determine whether the defendant falls into one of the CDC's classifications than it is to 
determine the effect the defendant's related complication will have. Nevertheless, this Note 
argues that the Guidelines demand this kind of inquiry. 
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B. Providing the Necessary Medical Care 
Several courts have argued that the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
can adequately serve inmates with IIlV and AIDs.109 In general, 
the correctional system carries a constitutional obligation to pro­
vide its inmates with adequate medical care.110 "The Supreme 
Court has declared that . . .  'deliberate indifference' by a correc­
tional system to the serious medical needs of its prisoners consti­
tutes the kind of 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' that is 
proscribed by the eighth amendment."111 
The prison system, therefore, has a duty to provide IIlV­
positive inmates with the medical care they require.112 In response 
to this mandate, the Federal Bureau of Prisons has created a multi­
layered medical system. Each inmate has a specified number of 
physicians, nurses, pharmacists and other medical personnel who 
are responsible for monitoring his condition.113 The Bureau of Pris­
ons also operates six specialized medical facilities, with the two 
principal facilities for men in Springfield, Missouri, and Rochester, 
Minnesota, and the principal one for women in Lexington, Ken­
tucky.114 The Federal Bureau of Prisons also implemented regula­
tions on January 22, 1991 that deal specifically with IIlV-positive 
109. See United States v. Rabins, 63 F.3d 721, 728 (8th Cir. 1995) (refusing to grant a 
downward departure because the HIV-positive defendant offered no evidence that he re­
quired care beyond what the prison system could provide); United States v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 
497 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant could receive adequate care for later stages of 
AIDS while in prison, so declining a request for a downward departure). One court even 
went so far as to hold that the defendant's condition had deteriorated enough to constitute an 
extraordinary physical impairment, but that it would be inhumane to release him because he 
had nowhere to receive treatment. See United States v. Streat, 893 F. Supp. 754, 757 (N.D. 
Ohio 1995). This decision would seem to indicate that not only does the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons provide reasonable medical care, but that, at least with respect to some defendants, it 
provides them with the best care they can get. The validity of this decision is questionable, 
however, at least if used to detain defendants for the purposes of providing medical care, 
given § 994(k)'s provision that it is inappropriate for a court to consider this factor in sen­
tencing. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (1983); supra note 58. 
110. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). 
111. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1504-05 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting Estelle 429 U.S. 
at 104). The constitutional standard for adequate care is a relatively low one. See, e.g., Scott 
Burris, Prisons, Law and Public Health: The Case for a Coordinated Response to Epidemic 
Disease Behind Bars, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 291, 321 (1992) ("While inmates enjoy an enforce­
able right to medical care that free Americans do not, the level of care guaranteed under that 
right is minimal."). This Note, however, argues that the Federal Bureau of Prisons provides 
reasonable medical care that is above the constitutional requirement. Where, as here, the 
prison system takes adequate steps to provide care above constitutional minimums, the lower 
level of protection that the Constitution provides is a somewhat peripheral issue. 
112. Indeed, a director and an assistant director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons have 
written specifically of the Bureau's responsibility toward HIV-positive inmates, stating that 
"prison administrators must provide health care that is commensurate with national commu­
nity standards." J. Michael Quinlan & Kenneth Moritsugu, AIDS in Prison: The Federal 
Experience, JUDGES' J., Summer 1990, at 26, 28. 
113. See Wtlbur, supra note 62, at 287. 
114. See id. 
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inmates.115 In their statement of purpose, the regulations provide 
that, "[i]n conjunction with the current medical procedures and 
treatments, the Bureau of Prisons provides programs of education, 
counseling, testing, and reporting for inmates to help restrict the 
spread of [HIV] and to maintain the quality of life for those who 
are HIV-positive."116 Specifically, section 549 provides that prison 
health staff must clinically assess each HIV-positive inmate's condi­
tion at least once quarterly117 and furnish him with pharmaceuticals 
approved by the FDA for use in the treatment of HIV-infected 
individuals.118 
Once a patient reaches the active-disease stage of AIDS, the 
prison system transfers him or her either to its hospital in Spring­
field, Missouri or to its facility in Rochester, Minnesota.119 Accord­
ing to one commentator, the Bureau of Prisons' "treatment of 
AIDS is that which is routinely expected in any other good hospital 
setting."120 In fact, "[i]t is of sufficiently high caliber that within the 
year 1989 six patients with AIDS who were offered early release 
from prison opted to stay within the [Federal Bureau of Prisons] 
hospital where they felt they could receive definitive care more 
readily than they could outside the institution."121 Consequently, it 
appears that the Federal Bureau of Prisons would be able to attend 
to any related complication as well. 
Several authors have argued that inmates receive less than ade­
quate medical care.122 Each of these authors, however, has focused 
primarily on various state systems.123 For example, one commenta­
tor addressed the California state system, and in particular, the Cal-
115. See 28 C.F.R. § 549, subpart A (1996). 
116. 28 C.F.R. § 549.10 (1996). 
117. See 28 C.F.R. § 549.18G). 
118. See 28 C.F.R. § 549.18(k). 
119. See Wilbur, supra note 62, at 293. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. See Deborah S. Chang & Patricia E. McCooey, Out of the Dark Ages and into the 
Nineties: Prisons' Responses to Inmates with AIDS, 23 CoNN. L. RE.v. 1001 (1991); Judy 
Greenspan, Struggle for Compassion: The Fight for Quality Care for Women with AIDS at 
Central California Women's Facility, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 383 (1994); Shawn Marie 
Boyne, Note, Women in Prison with AIDS: An Assault on the Constitution?, 64 S. CAL. L. 
REv. 741 (1991). 
123. See Boyne, supra note 119. Those authors that discuss the federal system at all, see, 
e.g., Chang & McCooey, supra, gather their data from the U.S. Department of Justice. See, 
e.g., THEODORE M. liAMMETr ET AL., 1994 UPDATE: HIV/AIDS AND STDs IN CoRREe­
TIONAL FACILITIES (1995). Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the quality of the federal 
system from these data alone because the Department of Justice's data fail to distinguish 
between state and federal systems. Thus, it is quite possible that insufficient state systems 
make quality of medical care provided by the federal system appear poorer than it is. As a 
result, this Note focuses on other sources of information and questions the applicability of 
conclusions drawn from the Department of Justice's data; Chang & McCooey, supra note 
119; Greenspan, supra note 119; 
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ifornia Institute for Women.124 She related stories in which 
"inmates often went weeks without sick call and without seeing a 
doctor"125 and in which prison guards left one inmate lying on the 
floor in her own excrement.126 As horrific as these stories are, the 
discussion above regarding the level of care the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons provides to its inmates indicates that it does not suffer from 
the same inadequacies. In particular, unlike the medical facilities 
administered by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the California Insti­
tute for Women is not even a licensed medical facility.127 Further­
more, this commentator herself notes a wide disparity in the level of 
medical care inmates receive even among different states.128 Con­
sequently, while these stories remain powerful, they are inapposite 
to the care inmates receive in federal prisons. 
Another pair of commentators focus on the Connecticut prison 
system. They describe instances in which "semicomatose inmates 
were not given medical treatment or sent to an outside hospital. "129 
Again, while deplorable, these stories do not tell a tale of what oc­
curs within the Federal Bureau of Prisons where, as argued above, 
prisoners receive regular medical care.130 
In essence, the Federal Bureau of Prisons provides its IDV­
positive inmates with the medical care they require. While some 
commentators have noted failings within various state systems, 
these failings are irrelevant to this Note's discussion. 
C. Prison's Effect on the Inmate's Condition 
Incarceration does not worsen an IDV-positive defendant's con­
dition sufficiently to warrant a downward departure. Because a de­
fendant must assert "extraordinary and compelling reasons" in 
order to qualify for a departure, he may not argue that simply being 
in prison generally exacerbates his condition.131 This reasoning ap­
pears to preclude a defendant from arguing, for example, that the 
stress of being in prison will worsen his condition. Instead, the de­
fendant must plead something more substantial. 
Some argue that the condition of a defendant who has a weak­
ened immune system necessarily will worsen while he is in 
124. See Boyne, supra note 119. 
125. Id. at 746. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 747. 
128. See id. at 757. 
129. Chang & McCooey, supra note 119, at 1003. 
130. In fact, due in large measure to a lawsuit this pair of commentators filed, these oc­
currences are no longer prevalent even within the Connecticut system. See id. at 1003·04. 
131. See United States v. Jefferson, 786 F. Supp. 1267, 1268 (N.D. W. Va. 1992). 
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prison.132 For example, two commentators argue that an HIV-posi­
tive inmate's weakened immune system makes him especially vul­
nerable to diseases such as tuberculosis (TB), and that given TB's 
resurgence in urban areas, IITV-positive inmates increasingly will 
face exposure to it in the New York State prison system.133 It is 
quite possible that this kind of threat would constitute extraordi­
nary and compelling circumstances. These analysts focus on the 
New York State prison system, however, rather than on the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons.134 
The federal system provides its inmates with up-to..:date medical 
care and transfers them to modem medical facilities when their im­
mune systems become seriously compromised.135 In addition, the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons isolates inmates with highly communica­
ble diseases like TB so that, as much as possible, HIV-positive in­
mates remain safe.136 Thus, while no prison system ever will be 
utterly without cross-contamination among inmates, the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons provides an environment in which this factor 
does not rise to a level of extraordinariness. 
Moreover, this argument focuses solely on a defendant's HIV 
status and not on his attending complication. In effect, the argu­
ment is as follows: IIlV weakens an individual's immune response; 
prison may be a place where the defendant will be exposed to other 
diseases; and the combination of these two factors means that 
prison will cause his condition, defined as his health generally, to 
decline. As noted in section II.A, however, concerns about health 
in general do not justify a downward departure - courts instead 
should focus on the related complication. 
D. The Possibility of Victimization 
The potential for victimization does not warrant a downward 
departure. While some claim that HIV-positive inmates are more 
susceptible to abuse than are normal inmates, they provide little 
evidence for this assertion.137 Not only is there little evidence that 
HIV-positive inmates are more susceptible to abuse than other in-
132. See, e.g., Faith Colangelo & Mariana Hogan, Jails and Prisons - Reservoirs of TB 
Disease: Should Defendants with HW Infection (Who Cannot Swim) be Thrown Into the 
Reservoir?, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 467 (1993). 
133. See id. 
134. See id. 
135. See supra section II.B. 
136. See 28 C.F.R. § 549.15(a) (1996) ("The [Clinical Director], in consultation with the 
[Health Services Administrator], shall ensure that inmates with infectious diseases which are 
transmitted through casual contact (e.g., tuberculosis, chicken pox, measles) are isolated 
from the general inmate population until such time as they are assessed or evaluated by a 
health care provider."). 
137. See, e.g., Kevin A. McGuire, Co=ent, AIDS and the Sexual Offender: The Epi­
demic Now Poses New Threats to the Victim and the Criminal Justice System, 96 D1CK. L. REv. 
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mates, intuitively it would seem they would be less so. Given that 
IIlV is transmitted through bodily fluid contact, inmates should be 
more likely to avoid their IIlV-positive fellow inmates than to as­
sault them.138 And while ostracism of this type certainly is unpleas­
ant, it is not cognizable under the Sentencing Guidelines as 
abuse.139 
Fmally, as with the concern that incarceration will worsen the 
defendant's condition, the victimization factor does not relate di­
rectly to a court's decision concerning a related complication. The 
victimization argument hinges on the claim that other inmates will 
harbor a distaste for IIlV-positive inmates and abuse them as a re­
sult. No one claims that inmates will abuse fellow inmates who are 
IIlV-positive because of their related complication, say pneumonia. 
Potential abuse thus is inapposite to the IIlV question for two rea­
sons. First, it is unlikely that inmates will abuse other inmates be­
cause of their lilV status. Second, it is even less likely they will 
abuse them because of their related complication, which is, as Part 
II argues, the relevant consideration given the Guidelines and their 
statutory foundation. 
In short, Part II argues that, as applied to IIlV status, the sever­
ity-and-predictability factor is both necessary and sufficient. The 
first factor is determinative because neither IIlV nor AIDS in the 
absence of an attending illness is sufficiently predictable to qualify 
under this requirement. Furthermore, each of the remaining three 
factors points toward :finding lilV status and AIDS ordinary, and 
suggests that IIlV-related complications are ordinary or irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
During the last few years, IIlV's progression has become more 
erratic and difficult to forecast rather than less so. During this same 
period, the number of individuals with the disease has increased 
steadily. At least for the foreseeable future, this second trend will 
continue and the justice system will feel its impact as much as any 
other area of society. Time and again judges will face an IIlV-
95, 110 & n.128 (1991) (discussing a New York State case in which HIV-negative inmates 
sought mandatory testing of all inmates and segregation for those testing positive). 
138. In fact, one of the authors who claim that IilV-positive inmates are susceptible to 
abuse cites for support a case in which IilV-negative inmates sued to have HIV-positive 
inmates sent to hospitals so as to create distance between them. See id. at 110 & n.128 (citing 
LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983)). 
139. If it were, courts would be forced to grant downward departures to child molesters, 
who are widely known to be the most ostracized of all inmates. See, e.g., James E. Robertson, 
The Constitution in Protective Custody: An Analysis of the Rights of Protective Custody In­
mates, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 91, 102-03 (1987) ("Child molesters, 'short eyes' in prison argot, 
represent 'the lowest, most despicable kind of criminal.' Like alleged informants, child mo­
lesters confront a presumptive threat of assault." (quoting M. PINERO, SHORT EYES 126 
(1975))). 
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positive defendant asking for a downward departure. Should the 
court grant that departure? 
This Note has argued that a court facing this question should do 
more than ascertain whether the defendant is IDV-positive. In­
stead the court should ask, does the complication, if any, accompa­
nying the defendant's IDV infection severely and predictably 
impair the defendant? Only if the court can answer this question 
affirmatively should it grant a downward departure. 
